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Religious Influences on Work–Family Trade-Offs 
Samantha K. Ammons 
Penny Edgell 
 
Abstract: Despite a large body of research on the influences of religion on family life and gender 
ideology, few studies examined how religion affects work—family strategies. One set of strategies 
involves making employment or family trade-offs—strategies of devoting time or attention to either 
work or family in a situation in which one cannot devote the preferred amount of time and attention to 
both, strategies that may be experienced as making sacrifices, hard choices, or accommodations. Using 
1996 General Social Survey data, the authors analyze how religion affects employment and family trade-
offs. They develop hypotheses about the institutional effects of religious involvement and effects of 
involvement in a conservative religious subculture. They find that religious involvement and religious 
subculture shape trade-offs in gender-specific ways, and that religion affects more of men's trade-offs. 
They conclude by calling for further research on the social sources of cultural frameworks that shape 
men's and women's work—family strategies. 
Keywords: religion, work—family   
 
Work–family strategies are practical routines of action that coordinate paid employment and family life 
(Moen & Wethington, 1992). Work–family strategies involve the exercise of agency within structural 
constraints and are best understood as choices made within a limited range of options and under 
conditions that systematically privatize the costs of work–family management (Becker & Moen, 1999). 
For many people today, individual or couple-level work–family strategies are the only practical means of 
achieving this coordination because “family-friendly” policies are not always utilized, even when 
available (Blair-Loy & Wharton, 2002; Eaton, 2003). Relatively little attention has been paid to how 
religion shapes work–family strategies. This is surprising, given that religion is an important source of 
the moral frameworks that shape understandings of appropriate gender roles and ideal family 
arrangements (Christiano, 2000; Edgell, 2005; Sherkat & Ellison, 1999). We investigate religious effects 
on men’s and women’s work–family strategies, with a particular focus on what Meninno and Brayfield 
(2002) called employment and family trade-offs.  
In recent decades managers and professionals have been spending increasingly long hours at work 
(Bluestone & Rose, 1997, 1998; Clarkberg & Moen, 2001; Figart & Golden, 1998; Hochschild, 1997; 
Jacobs & Gerson, 1998; Schor, 1991), whereas other workers have experienced chronic economic 
insecurity and underemployment (Schor, 1991).  
Whether due to time constraints or the demands of a job that may not be family friendly but is too 
precious to lose, the work–family strategies of many men and women today involve trade-offs—
strategies of devoting time or attention to either work or family in a situation in which one cannot 
devote the preferred amount of time and attention to both. Mennino and Brayfield (2002) identified 
two elements of trade-offs of particular interest for work–family scholars: They defined employment 
trade-offs as sacrifices people make in their job or career because of their family responsibilities, and 
family tradeoffs as compromises people make in their family lives because of the responsibilities of paid 
work. The use of terms such as compromise or sacrifice to denote trade-offs highlights the structural 
constraints that shape these choices (cf. Becker & Moen, 1999; Moen & Wethington, 1992).  
The current study examines the behavioral trade-offs that people make in managing their work and 
family commitments.1We used data from the 1996 General Social Survey (Davis, Smith, & Marsden, 
2005), which contains several measures of employment and family trade-offs, all of which focus on 
choices or decisions about allocating time to work and family life—decisions to refuse overtime or a 
promotion, to cut back or add hours at work, to miss a family event, or to reduce time spent on house 
tasks or caregiving. Previous research has highlighted how gender, family demands, employment 
demands, and human capital shape men’s and women’s work–family strategies more generally and, in 
particular, family and employment trade-offs (Bielby & Bielby, 1989; Hinze, 2000; Kmec, 1999; Mennino 
& Brayfield, 2002). In our analysis we controlled for the effects of factors that were identified in previous 
research and we explored whether religious beliefs and commitments have an effect on family and 
employment trade-offs net of these other factors. 
Blair-Loy (2003) and Gerson (2002) argued that work–family strategies are embedded in larger cultural 
frameworks that apportion the moral obligations of paid work and family caretaking among members. In 
the United States, religious traditions are important sources of family ideals and gender norms 
(Christiano, 2000; Edgell, 2005; Sherkat & Ellison, 1999). In particular, the conservative Protestant 
religious subculture is characterized by discourses that make specific claims about the gendered nature 
of women’s and men’s obligations to work and to family, identifying the ideal arrangement as the 
woman as caretaker and the man as breadwinner (Gallagher & Smith, 1999; Wilcox, 2004). We explored 
whether and how religion influences work–family strategies. We identified institutional features 
common among mainstream religious groups in the United States that may have an effect on work–
family strategies for those who are religiously involved.2 We also identified features associated with 
conservative Protestant religious subculture that may influence work–family strategies in distinctive 
ways for those involved in that subculture. We generated hypotheses about the effects of institutional 
and subcultural aspects of religion on employment and family trade-offs in analyses that control for 
other factors previously shown to shape these trade-offs. To investigate whether religion shapes 
gender-specific work–family trade-off patterns, we generated analyses for male and female subsamples.  
 
Structural Constraints on Trade-Offs  
Previous research has focused largely on the structural constraints that shape how men and women 
make employment and family trade-offs by analyzing the factors that make some jobs—and some 
families—more demanding than others. Professional and managerial jobs are more demanding in that 
they require longer hours of work (plus “face time”) and have strict career ladders that mean that 
scaling back on hours or refusing a promotion entails a significant sacrifice in career trajectory (Blair-Loy, 
2003; Fried, 1998; Hochschild, 1997). Family demands also vary with the presence of younger and older 
children and other obligations such as an elderly or ill relative (Eriksen & Gerstel, 2002; Higgins, 
Duxbury, & Lee, 1994; Hochschild, 1989). All things being equal, those with more demanding jobs are 
expected to make more family trade-offs, and those with more family demands are expected to make 
more employment trade-offs (Franklin, Ames, & King, 1994; Kmec, 1999; Mennino & Brayfield, 2002; 
Moen & Dempster-McClain, 1987). Of course, all things are seldom equal. Human capital, or higher 
levels of education, training, and work experience, can increase one’s power to resist employment 
demands (Barnett & Lundgren, 1998; Buck, Lee, MacDermid, & Smith, 2000).  
All of these factors—job demands, family demands, and human capital— are factors that may affect 
men and women; however, none of them operates in a gender-neutral way. Gender is an aspect of the 
self—gendered identities, gendered beliefs, and attitudes—and something that pervades and structures 
social institutions (Hall, 1993; Martin, 2003; Mennino & Brayfield, 2002). Gender, then, is developed 
through routines of interaction, and through the way that resources (such as jobs and human capital) 
are distributed. Gender as a social institution is a kind of constraint on agency, a structural influence on 
the choices people face in developing work–family strategies. It is unclear whether men and women 
experience work–family conflict at about the same rates or if there are gender differences (Bolger, 
DeLongis, Kessler, & Wethington, 1989; Duxbury, Higgins, & Lee, 1994; Frone, Russell, & Cooper, 1992; 
Grzywacz, Almeida, & McDonald, 2002; Gutek, Searle, & Klepa, 1991). However, overall, the work–
family strategies they use differ. Women are more likely to make employment trade-offs, take 
responsibility for family demands, and adjust their employment careers around their family’s needs 
(Hochschild, 1989; Mennino & Brayfield, 2002; Moen & Sweet, 2003), choices that reproduce a structure 
of gender inequality as women accrue lower lifetime earnings and occupational attainment than do 
men. And for women who do choose to invest in more human capital and pursue more workcentered 
lives, research suggests that this leads to more family trade-offs than the same choices lead to for men 
(Fried, 1998; Hochschild, 1997).  
In one sense it is entirely appropriate to treat gender as a structural constraint on employment and 
family trade-offs. The structure of gender inequality, for example, is what makes women “pay more” for 
making the same choices that men make; women who put career first really do bear more family-
related costs than do men with similar human capital (Blair-Loy, 2003; Fried, 1998; Hochschild, 1997), 
and the cultural ideal of the male breadwinner really does shape career ladders in a way that makes a 
certain understanding of work-oriented masculinity a structural reality and a cultural norm. However, it 
also makes sense to understand gender as a cultural factor that shapes how people exercise agency, or 
how people choose to prioritize given the range of options that structural conditions make available to 
them. Gendered norms of behavior—ideas about who ought to care for the family or who ought to 
spend longer hours on the job—are developed through gendered cultural frameworks that influence 
behavior. These cultural aspects of gender are often measured through gender ideology scales, and for 
men and women, gender ideology has a direct influence on employment and family trade-offs (Mennino 
& Brayfield, 2002). We argue that religion is another cultural factor that we need to take into account as 
we analyze how people exercise their agency—how they make choices—given the structural constraints 
they face. 
 
Religious Influences on Employment and Family Trade-Offs  
Religion provides cultural frameworks that specify who ought to care for the family or who ought to 
work long hours to support the family. Religion and family are intertwined and interdependent 
institutions (Christiano, 2000; Edgell, 2003, 2005; Houseknecht & Pankhurst, 2000; Sherkat & Ellison, 
1999). Religious involvement is associated with attitudes about family and gender and shapes how men 
and women invest their time and their identity in their roles as husband or wife, mother or father 
(Lehrer, 1996; Sherkat, 2000; Sherkat & Ellison, 1999; Wilcox, 2004). There has been little work on how 
religion shapes work–family strategies; however, other work on the influence of religion on marital 
decision making suggests we cannot assume that religious ideals influence behavior, including work–
family trade-offs, in a direct and straightforward way (Denton, 2004).  
We identified two different ways in which religious involvement may shape employment and family 
trade-offs for men and women. First, we argue that involvement in any mainstream religious institution 
may have an institutional effect on how men and women make employment or family trade-offs. We 
use the term institutional to indicate features that characterize the institutional field of mainstream 
religious groups in the United States and are common across the organizations within it (cf. Becker, 
1999; Warner, 1993; Wilcox, Chaves, & Franz, 2004). One common feature of American religious 
institutions is the centrality of religious familism—the ideology that the family is the precious, central 
unit of social order, and that family life should be governed by religious moral imperatives (Bendroth, 
2002; Christiano, 2000; Edgell, 2003, 2005; Sherkat & Ellison, 1999; Wilcox, 2004; Wilcox et al., 2004; 
Wuthnow, 1998). It is this widespread and shared religious familism, manifested in religious discourse 
and institutionalized routines of ministry (Wilcox et al., 2004; cf. Edgell, 2003, 2005), that leads scholars 
to identify familism as an institutional feature of American religious institutions (Christiano, 2000; Edgell, 
2003, 2005; Wilcox et al., 2004). 
How might religious familism affect how people make employment or family trade-offs? As early as the 
1950s, sociologists pointed to the role of churches as a primary means through which people lived out a 
familyoriented lifestyle, in contrast with a lifestyle based on careerism or consumerism (Bell, 1958; 
Bendroth, 2002; Wuthnow, 1998), and a recent study finds that across religious traditions 
congregational leaders still encourage members to spend less time at work and more time with family, 
and to reject the careerism and materialism that lead to overwork (Edgell, 2005). This leads to our first 
hypotheses about institutional religious effects on employment and family trade-offs:  
Hypothesis 1a: People who are more involved in mainstream religious institutions are more likely to 
make employment trade-offs to spend time with family than those who are not as involved in 
these institutions.  
Hypothesis 1b: People who are more involved in mainstream religious institutions are less likely to 
make family trade-offs because of work demands than those who are not as involved in these 
institutions.  
We used church attendance as our measure of religious involvement in mainstream religious institutions 
because participation in a local congregation is a good indicator for exposure to these institutional 
effects. In our analyses, we also explored how these institutional religious effects may vary according to 
one’s family status, especially marriage and the presence of children. These two hypotheses are framed 
as gender neutral because many studies suggest that religious familism operates as a cultural framework 
that encourages men and women to “put family first” in their investment of time (Christiano, 2000; 
Edgell, 2003, 2005; Wuthnow, 1998). However, by separating our analyses of men’s and women’s trade-
offs we can investigate whether these effects are in fact gender neutral or gender specific.  
We also investigate whether involvement in a conservative Protestant religious subculture has a 
particular effect on how men and women make choices regarding employment and family trade-offs. In 
the United States, conservative Protestant religious subcultures continue to uphold a traditionally 
gendered division of labor in the home as a moral ideal and base this on interpretations of the Bible that 
not only support the idea of the man as the “spiritual head” of the family but also manifest an 
understanding of men and women’s natures as essentially different (Bendroth, 2002; Gallagher & Smith, 
1999; Woodberry & Smith, 1998). And this has some effects on behavior. Some religiously conservative 
women restructure their labor-force participation around home demands, although the only large-scale 
study to date has found that these effects disappear when controlling for a range of human capital and 
labor market factors (cf. Lehrer, 1995; Sherkat, 2000). Conservative Protestant husbands tend to do less 
housework than their secular or liberalreligious counterparts (Edgell, 2005; Wilcox, 2004).  
On the other hand, conservative Protestant discourse about the ideal family is coupled with a kind of 
pragmatic egalitarianism in marriage (Gallagher & Smith, 1999; Hochschild, 1989); Denton (2004) found 
that in marital decision making about work, childrearing, and finances, conservative and liberal 
Protestants are not all that different. Moreover, a considerable amount of time and attention is given in 
conservative religious groups to fostering men’s involvement in the home; groups such as Promise 
Keepers and church-based men’s fellowship groups encourage men to develop the skills necessary to 
form loving relationships with their wives and a caring and involved style of parenting (Bartkowski, 2004; 
Singleton, 2003). Wilcox (2004) argued that this has a direct influence on men’s decisions to spend more 
time with their families.  
Because the cultural framework of religious conservatives emphasizes gender-specific roles in the family 
and essential differences in men’s and women’s natures, we develop gender-specific hypotheses about 
the effects of this subculture on employment and family trade-offs. For women, this is relatively 
straightforward:  
Hypothesis 2: After controlling for gender ideology, conservative Protestant women will make more 
employment trade-offs than nonconservative Protestant women and more than conservative 
Protestant men.  
Conservative Protestant women may make more employment trade-offs because of their desire to live 
up to the traditionally gendered ideal of the mother as caretaker upheld by their religious subculture. 
Being a conservative Protestant may affect women’s trade-off behaviors over and above the influence of 
personal gender ideology.  
For men, we developed competing hypotheses to test whether men are more influenced by the official 
gender ideology of their religious subculture, which emphasizes their role as provider and head of the 
household, or whether they are more influenced by the pragmatic egalitarianism and emphasis on 
men’s involvement in the family that some have identified in the daily practices of religious 
conservatism in the United States:  
Hypothesis 3a: After controlling for gender ideology, conservative Protestant men will make more 
family trade-offs and fewer employment trade-offs than other men, and fewer than 
conservative Protestant women. 
Hypothesis 3b: Conservative Protestant men will make more employment trade-offs than other men 
because they understand this as fulfilling the moral imperative to be more involved in their 
family life.  
We tested whether the traditional gender ideology present in conservative Protestant religious 
subcultures encourages men to pursue their role as the family provider and delegate more of the family 
caretaking to their wives.  
For men and woman, it may be that conservative religious views on gender are only partly captured by 
traditional gender ideology scales, and/or that conservative Protestantism provides support for men in 
transferring their gender beliefs into action. In assessing all of these hypotheses, we assess participation 
in a conservative Protestant subculture by one’s identification with a conservative religious 
denomination, using the standard religious affiliation item from the General Social Survey (Davis et al., 
2005). As with church attendance, we investigated whether the effects of religious subculture interact 
with family status.  
In summary, scholars who study work–family strategies have begun to emphasize the importance of 
analyzing cultural frameworks that shape understandings of gender today, including contemporary 
understandings of who is responsible for paid work and for family caretaking. We know quite a lot about 
how structural constraints shape work–family strategies; however, we believe a thorough understanding 
must include a consideration of structural constraints and the cultural frameworks that shape the 
choices that men and women do have. Religion has a formative influence on family life in the United 
States and is a primary cultural arena in which moral claims about gender and family are elaborated. 
However, few studies have examined whether and how religion influences the choices that men and 
women make when faced with the choices that contemporary structural arrangements make available, 
including the need to balance potentially conflicting demands or allocate scarce time. No studies have 
examined this question with the range of measures that we employed here, which assess multiple kinds 
of employment and family trade-offs using a nationally representative data set.  
This article begins the work of exploring how religious claims about moral responsibility for family 
caretaking and providing influence the behavior of contemporary men and women who face choices 
about investing time in work and family life. At the same time, our analyses are also sensitive to how 
structural constraints influence the strategies that men and women adopt. By identifying gender-specific 
and gender-neutral moral claims made by religious groups, we go beyond the sole focus on conservative 
religious subculture that has characterized much of the recent work on religion and gender to facilitate a 
broader understanding of the links between religion and work–family trade-offs. 
 
Method and Data  
We used data from the Gender Module of the 1996 General Social Survey (GSS; Davis et al., 2005). There 
were 2,904 respondents in the 1996 GSS; however, only 1,460 respondents were surveyed in the 
Gender Module. Following Kmec (1999) and Mennino and Brayfield (2002), we chose to further limit the 
current sample to respondents who were working full-time, part-time, or those with a job but who were 
currently not at work because of temporary illness, vacation, or strike. This reduced the sample size to 
994. We then limited the sample to respondents who had valid data on all independent and dependent 
variables. The exceptions are supervisor status, income, gender ideology, and church attendance (see 
our discussion of each exception in the Independent Variables section). This eliminated 127 
respondents. Our resulting sample was 867, 430 men (49.6%) and 437 women (50.4%).  
Previous research has suggested that conservative Protestant women with young children may be more 
likely to drop out of the labor force entirely until their children enter school (Lehrer, 1995; Sherkat, 
2000). We checked to see if conservative Protestant women were disproportionately more likely to drop 
out of our employed subsample and found that they are not. In the full 1996 GSS survey, 20% of 
respondents are conservative Protestant women; in the GSS Gender Module, 19% of respondents are 
conservative Protestant women, whereas for the employed subsample, the figure is 16%. Likewise, 
conservative Protestant women with young children compose 4% of the full 1996 GSS, 4% of the Gender 
Module, and 4% of our employed subsample.  
Analytical Strategy  
We perform logistic regression analysis on seven dependent variables that measure discrete work–
family strategies. All seven trade-offs were treated as separate variables and dichotomously coded 
(yes/no) because we wanted to investigate whether religion had a distinctive effect on particular 
employment or family trade-offs.3 Previous studies (Kmec, 1999; Mennino & Brayfield, 2002) have 
treated respondents’ gender as an independent variable much like income or educational attainment. 
We chose, instead, to separate our analyses by gender. This strategy allowed us to determine how the 
effects of religious subcultures vary by gender. It also eases presentation of our findings and eliminates 
the need for using three-way interaction terms, which are awkward to interpret because it is hard to 
convey in a clear and concise way which are the appropriate comparison groups.  
Because we were interested in documenting religious effects on trade-offs, we treated as controls the 
variables on structural constraints (job demands, family demands, human capital) and gender ideology 
identified in other research as having an effect on employment and family trade-offs (Kmec, 1999; 
Mennino & Brayfield, 2002). To see what effect our religion variables had over and above our controls, 
we initially ran our models first with controls and then added our religion variables; the results were not 
substantially different than those presented here.4 We know that gender ideology and religious 
affiliation are linked so we checked for these interactions (cf. Gallagher & Smith, 1999); we also checked 
for interaction effects between our religion variables and family structure, following work that suggests 
that family status and the ages of children may change religious involvement and motivate religious 
identification (cf. Edgell, 2005). For ease of presentation, we discuss and show main-effects models only 
when no interactions were significant.  
Dependent Variables  
Our seven dependent variables were drawn from the 1996 GSS Gender Module. They measured 
whether respondents had ever made employment or family trade-offs in their present job because of 
their family or job responsibilities. Three employment trade-off questions asked respondents whether 
they had (a) refused a promotion, (b) refused overtime, or (c) cut back on their hours. Respondents 
were also asked if they had ever made the following family trade-offs: (d) took on additional work, 
cutting into family time; (e) been unable to do the work they usually did around the house; (f) missed a 
family occasion or holiday; or (g) been unable to care for a sick child or relative.  
Independent Variables  
Gender ideology. To measure gender ideology, or beliefs about what men’s and women’s roles ought to 
be, we created a scale ranging from 0 to 16 using four popular GSS measures of gender-role beliefs (see 
Table 1). This scale is widely used by scholars, and in our analysis it had an alpha of .76. A higher score 
on this scale indicates a more conservative gender ideology and a lower score a more egalitarian 
ideology. To maximize our data, we followed the strategy used by Mennino and Brayfield (2002) and 
recoded respondents with missing data as having “no opinion.”  
Job demands. Previous scholars have found that men and women who work longer hours are more likely 
to make family trade-offs than other workers (Kmec, 1999; Mennino & Brayfield, 2002), and that self-
employment, supervisory status, and occupation are associated with employment tradeoffs (Mennino & 
Brayfield, 2002). In their analyses, Mennino and Brayfield (2002) found that men and women employed 
by large firms were less likely to refuse overtime than those who worked at smaller firms. In our models, 
we included occupation, supervisory status, self-employment status, hours worked per week, and 
number of employees at the respondent’s workplace (firm size) as our job demand variables. Firm size 
was dummy coded into 0 (less than 100 employees) and 1 (100 or more employees). The majority of the 
sample was employed at medium- or small-sized firms. Slightly more than one third worked at a firm 
with more than 100 employees (36%). Respondents worked 42 hours per week on average, with a range 
of 2 to 89. Self-employment was dichotomously coded from 0 to 1 with 0 indicating that men and 
women were employees and 1 signaling self-employment. Only 13% were self-employed. Occupation 
was coded into professional and managerial workers (1) and blue-collar, service, military, and white-
collar workers (0). Professionals or managers composed roughly one third of our sample (32%).  
Because a large percentage of GSS respondents did not report their supervisory status we chose not to 
exclude these individuals from our sample (Mennino & Brayfield, 2002). Instead, we treated them as a 
middle “don’t know” category and included a dummy variable for missing supervisory status in our 
analysis. In the sample, 25% of respondents supervised other orkers.  
Family demands. We measured family characteristics through three variables: marital status, presence 
of young children, and school-aged children living in the household. Marital status was dummy coded 1 
(married) and 0 (divorced, widowed, separated, never married, and single). Almost one half of the 
sample were married (48%), 17% had children younger than age 6 living with them, and 22% were living 
with school-aged children between age 6 and 17 years.  
Human capital. We used household income, proportion of income contributed by the respondent, age, 
and educational attainment as our measures of human capital. Following Kmec (1999) and Mennino and 
Brayfield (2002), we substituted the midpoint value for each income category and used Pareto’s curve 
(Parker & Fenwick, 1983) to set the last category midpoint to US$103,868.60 for household income and 
individual income at US$97,462.43. We substituted respondent’s individual income for household 
income if respondents were not married and failed to report their household income. If respondents 
were married and missing either household or individual income, we substituted the mean income from 
similar respondents (based on sex and occupation). Eleven percent of our sample did not report 
household and respondent income. We included them in our income measure and in a separate dummy 
variable. We calculated the proportion of income that respondents contributed to the household by 
dividing individual income by household income. Respondents with proportions over 1 (due to missing 
data reassignment) were excluded from the sample. The average household income was $44,215. The 
mean respondent age was 41 years with a range of 19 to 83, and most (89%) had at least a high school 
diploma.  
Religion. Our religion variables are religious subculture and church attendance. We dummy coded 
religious preference into other (0) and conservative Protestant (1),5 which means that our results 
contrast conservative Protestants and everyone else (Catholics, Jews, non-Conservative Protestants, and 
those with other or no religious affiliation).6 In our sample, 31% of women and 32% of men identified as 
belonging to a conservative Protestant group. Church attendance was coded from 0 (never) to 8 (several 
times a week). Rather than exclude a sizable number of respondents with missing data for church 
attendance, we assigned missing cases the mean church attendance from respondents of their same 
sex, religious identity, and religiosity (self-reported importance of religion). This boosted our sample by 
15 cases. Respondents with missing attendance data that were also missing data on their religiosity or 
religious identity were excluded from the sample. The mean church attendance for our sample was 3.5 
(attended church several times a year). Fourteen percent of our sample never went to church in the past 
year, 14% went to church every week, and 6% reported attending church several times a week.  
Race and region. We controlled for race in our analysis, dichotomously coding it into White and Other. 
The vast majority of men and women were White (82%). We also controlled for region because there is 
evidence to suggest that Southerners hold more traditional gender ideology beliefs than men and 
women living in other regions (Powers et al., 2003; Rice & Coates, 1995). We dummy coded region into 
South (1) and Midwest, East, and West (0). Thirty-six percent of the sample lived in the South.  
 
Results  
Descriptive Findings  
We found that men and women differ in predictable but important ways, specifically in their hours 
worked and in income (see Table 2). On average, women earned less money than men, their earnings 
constituted a smaller proportion of their household’s total income, they were more likely to have 
missing data for income, and they worked 5 fewer hours per week than men. Women were also more 
likely to be in managerial or professional occupations and to have higher educational attainments than 
men. There were slight variations in marital status and gender ideology, and women were more likely to 
have school-age children than men. Overall, close to one half of our sample were currently married; 
however, men were slightly more likely to be married (52% vs. 44%) than women. Men were more likely 
to be White, in supervisory positions at work, more likely to have traditional gender ideology beliefs 
than women, and went to church less frequently. However, there were no gender differences in men’s 
and women’s likelihood of self-identifying as a conservative Protestant. 
As Table 3 shows, men are more likely to miss a family event and add additional work than women. 
Women have higher likelihood of being unable to care for family members. Married men and women 
are more likely than unmarried respondents to refuse a promotion, refuse overtime, cutback on their 
workload, add additional work, and to miss caregiving demands. Similarly, respondents with young 
children are more likely to refuse overtime, be unable to meet their caregiving responsibilities, and be 
unable to fulfill their home task demands. Men and women that attend church at least once a month or 
more are less likely to miss a family event than those that attend church less frequently. They are also 
more likely to cut back on their work.7 There were no statistically significant differences in family trade-
offs or employment trade-offs by religious subculture.8  
Table 4 and Table 5 display the results of our logistic regression analysis for women’s and men’s 
employment and family trade-offs. Each dependent variable has one or two models. The first model 
contains our main effects, such as gender ideology, work and family demands, religious subculture, and 
church attendance. For some of our outcome variables we include a second model with interaction 
terms.  
Our results indicate that employment and family trade-off predictors vary by gender, that religion 
operates in complex ways to affect the likelihood of making these trade-offs, and that a wider range of 
men’s trade-offs are influenced by religion than is true for women. Overall, women’s employment trade-
offs are most influenced by work demands and autonomy—especially the choice to be self-employed—
and not family demands or religion. Women’s family trade-offs are influenced by various factors—work 
demands, family demands, and religion, but also age and their share of household income. For men, the 
story is different. Men’s work–family trade-offs are influenced by family demands and religion, whereas 
their family demands are influenced by work demands, family demands, and religion.  
Women  
Among women, we found no support for Hypothesis 1a; religious involvement does not affect women’s 
employment trade-off decisions. However, we did find support for Hypothesis 1b; church attendance, 
our measure of the institutional effects of religion, does reduce women’s likelihood of making two of 
our four family trade-offs. We found no support for Hypothesis 2; conservative Protestant women are 
not more likely than other women to make employment trade-offs for the sake of family, although in 
the model for cutting back on hours at work, the conservative Protestant effect approaches statistical 
significance. Moreover, conservative Protestant women are more likely to make one of our family trade-
offs, a finding we discuss below. Overall, work demands and autonomy shape women’s employment 
tradeoffs, whereas an assortment of family demands, work demands, human capital, and religion affect 
women’s likelihood of family trade-offs.  
Women’s employment trade-offs. As shown in Table 4, we found no support for Hypothesis 1a or 
Hypothesis 2 regarding religious influences on women’s employment trade-offs. Religious involvement 
and conservative religious subcultures do not encourage women to make employment tradeoffs. 
However, the effect of conservative Protestant identity on women’s choice to cut back on their hours 
approaches significance and may warrant further investigation in future research. Family demands and 
human capital variables also are not strong predictors of employment trade-offs for women; race (being 
White) does predict women’s odds of refusing a promotion. Only one type of family demand is 
significant, and it is only significant for one employment trade-off of three; women with young children 
are almost twice as likely to refuse overtime than are women who do not have children younger than 
age 6 years. Work demands best explain women’s likelihood of making employment trade-offs. Women 
are more likely to refuse a promotion if they are a supervisor and are not in a professional or managerial 
occupation, and women employed in smaller firms are less likely to refuse overtime than women 
employed in larger firms. Self-employed women are also more likely to cut back on their work and more 
likely to refuse overtime. Women’s family trade-offs. As Table 4 shows, our findings did not reveal a 
straightforward story for family trade-offs among women. Family demands, work demands, human 
capital, and religion all matter, but not in uniform ways across all family trade-offs. Overall, we found 
support for Hypothesis 1b. When women attend church more frequently, they are less likely to make 
two types of family trade-offs. Church attendance decreases women’s odds of missing a family event. 
And though women with young children at home are much more likely to report being unable to do the 
work they usually do around the house, church attendance ameliorates, but does not eliminate, the 
impact of young children on women’s ability to complete tasks at home.9 Unexpectedly, our findings 
indicate that women within conservative religious subcultures are more likely to miss caregiving tasks 
than women from moderate or liberal religious subcultures. Although this is less true for those with 
young children, it is still true even for them. We believe that it is possible that conservative Protestant 
women can rely on their husbands for crisis care of a sick child or relative; however, it is also possible 
that these women have supportive religious networks that help in such situations.  
Work and family demands have an impact on women’s family trade-offs. Married women are more 
likely to take on additional work and to miss caregiving tasks but less likely than unmarried women to 
miss a family event. Women with young children younger than age 6 years are 5 times more likely to 
have trouble completing tasks at home, although as mentioned above, church attendance ameliorates 
this effect somewhat. Women with young children are also more than 5 times more likely to have 
difficulty with their families’ caregiving needs. Work demands also matter for women. Women that work 
longer hours per week are more likely to have missed home tasks, and to have missed family events. 
Women supervisors have higher odds of missing family events than women without supervisory duties 
at work, and professional and managerial women are more likely to have missed home tasks. 
Human capital variables were the weakest predictors of women’s family trade-offs. Educational 
attainment, age, and income variables each only significantly fit only one family trade-off variable. 
Women are more likely to add work if they have less education, and younger women are less likely to 
miss a family event than older-aged women. Last, women that contribute a larger share of their earnings 
to the household income have higher odds of missing home tasks because of their work demands. 
Women who did not report either their household or personal income are also significantly more likely 
to miss a family event.  
Men  
As Table 5 indicates, religion has an institutional effect on men’s odds of making family trade-offs, 
supporting Hypothesis 1b; church attendance is also associated for men with cutting back on hours at 
work; however, as for women, this effect is only significant at the p < .10 level, providing only suggestive 
support for Hypothesis 1a. Conservative religious subcultures affect men’s likelihoods for employment 
trade-offs, although the effects are mixed and provide support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Overall, family 
demands, gender ideology, and religion, rather than work demands and human capital, best predict 
men’s odds of employment trade-offs. Family and work demands and religion best explain men’s family 
trade-offs.  
Men’s employment trade-offs. Involvement in religious institutions and in conservative religious 
subcultures encourages men to alter their work involvement but not always in the hypothesized 
direction. Men from conservative Protestant subcultures are less likely to refuse a promotion. However, 
men who attend church more frequently or belong to a conservative Protestant subculture are more 
likely to cut back on hours spent at work; these findings are only marginally significant and should be 
considered suggestive for future research.  
Traditional gender ideology intertwines with religious subculture involvement and church attendance in 
disparate ways that affect men’s odds of employment trade-offs. Men with traditional gender ideology 
from conservative Protestant subcultures are more likely to refuse a promotion, whereas men with 
traditional gender ideology that attend church more often have lower odds of cutting back their work 
involvement. Gender ideology, church attendance, and religious subculture combine to affect men’s 
trade-off behaviors in unique ways. Perhaps most interesting is the insight that for conservative 
Protestant men, it is those with the most traditional gender ideology who are the most likely to refuse a 
promotion (make an employment tradeoff), suggesting that the men who are the most influenced by 
this subculture’s moral rhetoric on gender roles are the most likely, in practice, to put career second and 
family first. This supports Gallagher and Smith’s (1999) argument that the traditional gender ideology 
espoused by conservative Protestants can, in practice, lead to more egalitarian outcomes.  
Men with young children are twice as likely to refuse a promotion, twice as likely to refuse overtime, 
and more likely to cut back on their work than men without young children. Fathers of school-age 
children are also more likely to cut back on their work. Marital status only significantly predicted one 
type of employment trade-off. Married men are 2 times more likely to refuse overtime than unmarried 
men. No work demand or human capital variables were statistically significant; however, marginally 
significant results indicate that men are more likely to cut back on work when they supervise others and 
more likely to refuse a promotion when their household income is high. When men work more hours 
per week they are also less likely to refuse overtime.  
Men’s family trade-offs. Family demands and work demands have the most influence on men’s family 
trade-offs; however, religious involvement makes married men less likely to miss a family event. Gender 
ideology, human capital, and religious subculture variables are not significant predictors of men’s family 
trade-offs.  
Men were most likely to make family trade-offs if they had heavy family or work demands. Men with 
young children are more likely to be unable to care for sick family members than men without children 
younger than age 6 years. If men have supervisory duties at work they have higher odds of missing a 
family event, are more likely to be unable to care for family members, and have trouble finding time for 
their home tasks (marginally significant). Professionals or managerial men are also more likely to be 
unable to take care of their home task responsibilities but are less likely to take on additional work. Men 
who are self-employed are 2 times more likely to be unable to care for family members than men who 
were employees, and those that work more hours per week are significantly more likely to miss family 
events.  
Family demands, such as marriage, having children younger than age 6 years, or having school-age 
children also affected men’s family trade-offs. Men have higher odds of adding work when they are 
married or have school-age children, and married men are twice as likely as unmarried men to miss a 
family event. However, church attendance interacts with marriage to affect the odds of missing a family 
event. Married men who attend church frequently are less likely to miss a family occasion than married 
men who do not attend church as often. Last, men that lived in the South had lower odds of working 
additional hours than men residing in other regions. Comparisons—Women and Men Relative to men, 
women’s trade-offs are more influenced by the presence of young children and by their share of 
income. Religious involvement does make women more family oriented; however, participation in a 
conservative Protestant subculture has no effect on six of women’s strategies; and, for the one strategy 
for which it is significant, it works in the opposite way than was expected. The most striking difference is 
that women’s employment tradeoffs are influenced almost entirely by job demands and autonomy 
whereas men’s are almost unaffected by these factors and are driven by religion and family demands. In 
comparison with women, job constraints play a different role for men, making them more likely to make 
family trade-offs in favor of work, whereas for women, job constraints affect their employment 
tradeoffs the most. Religious involvement does make men more family oriented overall. For those 
conservative Protestant men who most affirm a traditional gender ideology, participation in that 
subculture influences is associated with one employment trade-off in favor of their families (refusing a 
promotion), whereas other conservative Protestant men are less likely to make this trade-off. And 
church attendance makes married men less likely to miss an important family event.  
Comparisons between women and men demonstrate pervasive gender differences in the relative 
influences of job demands and human capital, family demands, and religion on employment and family 
trade-offs. They also suggest the utility of using measures that can capture discrete trade-offs because 
different combinations of factors affect men and women differently for different kinds of choices.  
Summary  
Kmec (1999) and Mennino and Brayfield (2002) conducted analyses of work–family trade-offs using the 
1996 GSS. Whereas Kmec examined only three of the four family trade-offs that we included and did not 
study employment trade-offs, Mennino and Brayfield studied the same seven work–family strategies 
that we utilized. In many ways, our results replicate Mennino and Brayfield’s findings for the effects of 
job demands, employment demands, and human capital on employment and family trade-offs and 
Kmec’s results for family trade-offs. Similar to Kmec, we found that hours worked per week and having 
young children significantly affect the likelihood of missing a family event, being unable to provide care 
to one’s family, and to do regular house tasks. Like Mennino and Brayfield, we found that there was not 
much difference in employment and family trade-offs between those with conservative and liberal 
gender ideology and that family demands are significant predictors of family trade-offs. However, 
because we separated our entire analysis by sex, we found that though men and women look similar in 
regard to family trade-offs, their predictors of employment trade-offs vary dramatically. Work demands 
are most significant for women, whereas family demands, gender ideology, and religion affect men’s 
odds for employment trade-offs.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
Sociologists of religion often lament that their work on religion and family is not widely taken into 
account by others who study the family (Ammerman & Roof, 1995; Becker & Hofmeister, 2000; Sherkat 
& Ellison, 1999). Reviews of the literature on family life (Cherlin, 1996) and work–family management 
(Spain & Bianchi, 1996) mention religion only in passing or not at all (Perry-Jenkins, Repetti, & Crouter, 
2000).10 However, family scholars are beginning to call for just such an integration of work across 
subfields (Daly, 2003; Gerson, 2002), and research that features such integration is appearing in high-
profile journals (Denton, 2004; Myers, 1996; Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, & Waite, 1995). We also believe it is 
important to integrate the scholarship on religion and family life with scholarship on work–family 
strategies. With Gerson (2002), we agree that we must understand more fully how cultural frameworks 
shape understandings of who is morally responsible for caretaking and financial providing if we are to 
understand not only the structural constraints that shape available choices but also how the choices we 
make to reproduce or challenge traditional understandings of gender, work, and family life.  
We set out to investigate whether and how religion may influence men’s and women’s employment and 
family trade-offs. Although scholars of religion have documented many ways in which religious belief 
and religious involvement influence family life and understandings of gender roles, little research has 
explored how religion shapes the choices men and women make about how to invest their time when 
work and family demands create conflicts or necessitate hard choices, and none of this research draws 
on recent, nationally representative data and looks at a wide range of employment and family tradeoffs. 
Although making trade-offs is only one type of work–family strategy, it is an important one in an era of 
increasing time spent at paid work and workplaces that still tend to take a historically “male” model of 
work—and career— as the norm.  
Our findings support the conclusion that religion does affect some employment and family trade-offs 
and that religious influences act differently on women and men and depend in part on family status. The 
inclusion of religion in analyses of work–family trade-offs, we believe, can help scholars better 
understand men’s and women’s work and family experiences. For example, the fact that religious 
influences depend on family status for men and women suggests that religious cultural frameworks 
affect how men and women interpret the relevance of family demands for their own work–family 
strategies.  
We hypothesized that church attendance would have a gender-neutral effect on men and women, 
encouraging both to make employment trade-offs and not to make family trade-offs. We found that 
church attendance makes men and women favor “family-centered” trade-offs. However, our data also 
reveal that going to church affects men’s and women’s trade-offs differently, affecting different kinds of 
decisions and interacting in different ways with family structure. Previous scholarship has paid a great 
deal of attention to the conservative Protestant subculture, with its explicit, and very public, rhetoric 
about gender roles and family norms. Our analyses suggest the importance of analyzing the institutional 
features common across religious traditions in the United States. The familism others have identified as 
a central feature of mainstream religious institutions does, in fact, shape the choices men and women 
make.  
We also found that conservative religious subcultures do affect some employment and family trade-offs 
and men’s and women’s choices differently. However, we did not find strong support for the idea that 
participation in a conservative religious subculture makes either women or men choose trade-offs in 
more traditional, less egalitarian ways. With Denton (2004), we urge caution in assuming that 
conservative Protestant rhetoric is translated in a straightforward way into patriarchal family practices 
(cf. Wilcox, 2004).  
Overall, we found that religion has an effect on employment and family trade-offs for men, though 
being irrelevant to women’s employment tradeoffs. Taken together, our religion variables had a 
significant effect on two of men’s trade-offs and three of women’s trade-offs; the marginally significant 
findings for men and women on the influence of religion on cutting back on work hours merit further 
investigation. In some ways, this pattern of findings is surprising. Spain and Bianchi (1996) argued that 
work–family management is viewed not only in the academic literature but also in the culture at large as 
a “woman’s issue.” For women, it is assumed that influences on employment and family trade-offs begin 
early in life and stem from multiple sources, being “overdetermined” by structural conditions and 
cultural frameworks. For men, however, religious institutions may be one of the only contexts that 
encourage them to lead a family-centered life and to make trade-offs that invest time in family over 
work (Edgell, 2005; Wilcox, 2004; Wilcox et al., 2004). One might have expected religion to shape men’s 
trade-offs more than it does women’s. Our findings suggest that this is not the case but do suggest that 
religion influences men and women differently.  
It is important to note the limitations of the measures available in this data set, as they influence how to 
interpret our findings and the more general claims we can make. It is impossible to tell who, in our 
sample, was ever offered a promotion, or who was asked to work overtime. We do not have information 
about job tenure or know how much autonomy (actual or perceived) workers in our sample have. We 
also do not know about other family constraints, such as the need to care for aging parents, an 
increasingly common family demand that is likely to occur just as men and women are in their prime 
years in employment productivity and achievement. We cannot know if the self-employed chose this 
option because it offered them more flexibility or if they were making do after a layoff or because they 
were not able to find firm-based employment after dropping out of the labor force to have a child. Also, 
this data set does not allow us to examine how men and women may “trade off” investment in career 
and family over the life course, as a couple-level work–family strategy (Becker & Moen, 1999).  
Our analysis suggests that it is worth taking religious involvement and identity into account in future 
studies that explore these questions. Another area to be investigated is the effect of religion on 
subjective trade-offs, which were beyond the scope of the current analysis. Our models of behavioral 
trade-offs show the strong effects of structural constraints on men’s and women’s choices; and 
behavioral trade-offs may be particularly constrained by structural factors. Religion, and cultural 
frameworks in general, may have a greater effect on subjective trade-offs such as commitment to work 
or family life, or feelings of satisfaction with employment, marriage, and parenting relationships.  
Our analyses support those who are calling for more research into how cultural frameworks influence 
men’s and women’s work–family strategies and show that religion should be analyzed more 
systematically as a source of these cultural frameworks. Most mainstream religious institutions critique 
the careerism and materialism often associated with a work-oriented life and make moral claims about 
the need to put family first. Conservative religious subcultures make traditionally gendered moral claims 
about appropriate work–family strategies for men and women. We believe it is important to continue to 
examine how men and women seek out and utilize opportunities to express their cultural 
understandings and moral priorities in their choices about work and family life.  
 
Notes  
1. Employment and family trade-offs can have subjective elements, such as reducing or restructuring 
subjective commitment to paid work or family life, changing expectations for what one can accomplish, 
or changes in the way one feels about one’s job or family (Bielby & Bielby, 1989; Pixley & Moen, 2003; 
Price & Mueller, 1986). These subjective trade-offs, though important, are beyond the scope of the 
current analysis.  
2. Mainstream denotes the Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish organizations that compose the dominant 
religious establishment in the United States (see Edgell, 1999, or Wuthnow, 1988). Mainline refers to a 
specific group of liberal Protestant denominations (Wuthnow & Evans, 2002).  
3. We also checked to see if the dependent variables scaled together well. The three employment trade-
offs have an alpha of .5584, the four family trade-offs have an alpha of .4764, and all seven variables 
together have an alpha of .575, confirming our decision to treat these as separate choices in the current 
analyses.  
4. Models available by request.  
5. The initial question on religious identification on the General Social Survey (GSS; Davis, Smith, & 
Marsden, 2005) asks the respondents to name their religious preference as Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, 
some other religion, or no religion. Those naming Protestant are then asked “What denomination is 
that, if any?” that are field-coded into 26 possibilities or into a 27th, “Other, please specify” that is 
available as a text file. Conservative Protestants are designated from these answers based on the coding 
scheme used by T. W. Smith (1987) that, for conservative Protestants, yields a classification similar to 
that recommended by Steensland et al. (2000).  
6. We are particularly interested in whether conservative Protestants have a different profile of 
employment and family trade-offs than do other respondents because there is a substantial literature 
on the distinctiveness of this subculture, the thesis of which is that this distinctiveness depends largely 
on, and is reproduced through, a neo-patriarchal family formation and a traditionally gendered division 
of labor (Gallagher & Smith, 1999; C. Smith, 1998). Other scholars of work–family strategies have begun 
to look for this “conservative Protestant” effect (Denton, 2004), and we want to expand on and 
contribute to that investigation. Although this does not allow us to investigate the full range of religious 
identities and how they relate to employment and family trade-offs, it is a good starting point and one 
that is appropriate to our data.  
7. In the current analyses we treat religious attendance as continuous. For descriptive purposes in this 
section we report it as dichotomous. 
8. Results (t tests) available by request.  
9. The women who are most likely to be unable to complete tasks at home are those who attend church 
rarely and have young children, followed by those who attend church rarely and do not have young 
children, than by frequent church attenders who have young children. The least likely to be unable to 
complete tasks at home are women who attend church frequently and do not have young children.  
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